In re Feinberg, 2009 Ill. Slip Op. 106982 (SC Sept. 24, 2009): The Illinois Supreme Court decided whether to invalidated an inheritance condition based on marrying within the Jewish faith.
Facts:
Max Feinberg, who died in 1986, left a wife, Erla, two adult children, and five grandchildren. He had executed a will that created trusts from which his widow would receive income during her lifetime. At her death, the trust assets were to be combined, and half of these assets were to be held in trust for the benefit of the grandchildren during their lifetimes, provided they had not married out of the Jewish faith, in which case they were to be “deemed deceased” on the date of such a marriage. Shares of such “deceased” grandchildren would revert to the settlor’s two children. Between 1990 and 2001, all of the five grandchildren married.
Distribution of decedent’s assets did not go according to this original plan, however, because Max also gave his widow a limited lifetime power of appointment as to his descendants which she exercised in 1997. Instead of lifetime trusts, she directed that, at the time of her death, fixed $250,000 sums be given to each of her two children and to each of her five grandchildren. She provided, however, that, as to the latter, her husband’s religious-restriction clause must be complied with. Erla died in 2003. By this time, although all the grandchildren had married, only one had complied with the religious restriction.
This situation resulted in several different proceedings which were consolidated in the circuit court of Cook County. The religious-restriction clause was invalidated there as contrary to public policy, and the appellate court affirmed.
In reaching a different result, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the issue is not Max’s original scheme of lifetime trusts for the grandchildren, but the distribution which was authorized by Erla, giving out fixed sums at the time of her death. The supreme court declined to hold the religious-restriction clause void. The grandchildren had no vested interests and Erla had merely created a condition precedent that operated on the date of her death to determine who was qualified to take. The supreme court said Erla was free to make a distribution in favor of grandchildren whose lifestyles were approved of over other grandchildren who made choices which were disapproved of.
The judgment of the appellate court was reversed, and the cause was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
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